

FILED
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
4/1/2024 4:17 PM
BY ERIN L. LENNON
CLERK

NO. 1027397
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

RANDALL R. STEICHEN,

Petitioner,

vs.

1223 SPRING STREET OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Washington non-profit corporation; CWD GROUP, a Washington corporation; VALARIE FARRIS OMAN, a citizen of the State of Washington; CONDOMINIUM LAW GROUP, PLLC, a Washington professional limited liability company; DAVID BUCK, a citizen of the State of Washington; DANA REID, a citizen of the State of Washington; JEREMY SPARROW, a citizen of the State of Washington; ROBERT MOORE, a citizen of the State of Washington; CATHERINE RAMSDEN, a citizen of the State of Washington,

Respondents.

**APPEAL FROM KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
Honorable Ken Schubert, Judge**

**ANSWER TO MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF
RESPONDENTS 1223 SPRING STREET OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
BUCK, REID, SPARROW, MOORE, AND RAMSDEN**

**REED McCLURE
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I. IDENTITY OF RESPONDING PARTY AND RELIEF REQUESTED

Respondents 1223 Spring Street Owners Association (as defendant and counterclaimant), and defendants Buck, Reid, Sparrow, Moore, and Ramsden (“the Association respondents”), request that this Court deny petitioner’s Motion for Discretionary Review of the Court of Appeals January 31, 2024, Order Denying Motion to Modify the Commissioner’s November 13, 2023, notation ruling regarding attorney fees and costs on appeal.

II. NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a challenge by a condominium owner to the efforts to collect unpaid assessments. The owner sued the condominium association board, individual board members, the condo’s management company, and the attorney and law firm hired to collect the debt. The superior court granted summary judgments dismissing the owner’s claims against the association. The superior court awarded attorney fees to all defendants. And the superior court granted relief to the association on its counterclaim and awarded attorney fees on the counterclaim. The

condo owner appealed. Division I of the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court and awarded attorney fees and costs to all defendants/respondents. Defendants/respondents submitted fee requests. Appellant/petitioner did not object to the attorney fee submissions with the exception of the. Fees awarded on the Association's counterclaim. The Court of Appeals Commissioner issued a ruling awarding attorney fees and costs. After the Commissioner's ruling, appellant/petitioner moved to modify the ruling. The Court of Appeals denied the motion to modify. Petitioner now moves this Court to accept discretionary review. The motion should be denied.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Should this Court deny petitioner's motion for discretionary review where Division I's order denying the motion to modify the Commissioner's attorney fee ruling was not obvious error and further proceedings are not rendered useless?
2. Should this Court deny petitioner's motion for discretionary review where Division I's order denying the motion to modify

the Commissioner's attorney fee ruling was not probable error and does not substantially alter the status quo or substantially limit the freedom of a party to act?

- A. Where respondents' request for fees on appeal was broad enough to cover both roles as defendant and as Counterclaimant.
- B. Where RCW 64.34.455 can apply equally to collection of delinquent assessments.
- C. Where respondents adequately pled a claim for attorney fees and costs.

3. Should this Court deny petitioner's motion for discretionary review where Division I's order denying the motion to modify the Commissioner's attorney fee ruling did not depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings?

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 23, 2023, Division I of the Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming the superior court's judgments and orders and awarding attorney fees to all respondents. *Steichen v. 1223 Spring St. Owners Ass'n*, 2023 Wash. App. LEXIS 1993, at *1-8 (Wash. App. Oct. 23, 2023). On November 2, 2023, all

respondents filed affidavits of fees and expenses pursuant to RAP 18.1(d). Any objection to those affidavits were due no later than November 13, 2023. RAP 18.1(e). Appellant only filed an objection to the Association's request for fees on its counterclaim.

On November 13, 2023, Commissioner Jennifer Koh of the Court of Appeals, issued a written ruling awarding the Association \$50,000 in attorney fees and \$1,266.73 in costs for a total of \$51,266.73 for prevailing on appeal in its defense against petitioner's arguments. Commissioner Koh also awarded the Association \$15,555 in attorney fees for prevailing on petitioner's appeal of the superior court's order awarding the Association past due assessments and attorney fees and costs in connection with its counterclaim. App. A at 3-4. In the Association respondents' brief, at page 41, they requested an award of attorney fees on appeal. The basis for that award was discussed by the Association on pages 38-41.

On December 13, 2023, petitioner moved the Court of Appeals to modify the Commissioner's ruling. On January 31, 2024, the Court of Appeals denied that motion. Motion for DR App. at 1-2. Petitioner now seeks discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' order denying the motion to modify.

V. ARGUMENT

This Court will accept review only if one or more of the following criteria exists:

- (1) If the Court of Appeals has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; or
- (2) If the Court of Appeals has committed probable error and the decision of the Court of Appeals substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; or
- (3) If the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a trial court or administrative agency, as to call for the exercise of revisory jurisdiction by the Supreme Court.

RAP 13.5(b). The Motion for Discretionary Review should be denied because this case does not satisfy any RAP 13.5(b) requirement.

A. DENYING THE MOTION TO MODIFY THE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS RULING WAS NOT OBVIOUS ERROR AND CERTAINLY DID NOT RENDER FURTHER PROCEEDINGS USELESS.

Petitioner appears to contend that the Court of Appeals' order denying his motion to modify was obvious error because the Association allegedly failed to comply with RAP 18.1 requirements for an attorney fee award. Petitioner concedes, as he must, that the Association respondents requested attorney fees in their Brief of Respondents. (Motion for DR at 11-12 n.5) Petitioner's concession eliminates the potential of obvious error. Nevertheless, petitioner again refers to inadmissible mediation materials to argue the Association is precluded from an award of attorney fees under RCW 64.34.455. (Motion for DR at 17, citing CP 1435) RCW 7.07.030 expressly prohibits reference to mediation materials. And petitioner's argument is merely a

collateral attack on Division I's decision. Division I's denial of the motion to modify was entirely correct and proper.

And assuming for sake of argument only that Division I's order denying the motion to modify could be deemed obvious error, nothing about the order renders further proceedings useless. As discussed further below, Division I properly awarded attorney fees to the Association, Commissioner Koh's ruling on fees was proper, and Division I's denial of the motion to modify were all properly granted. Petitioner's motion for discretionary review should be denied.

B. DENYING THE MOTION TO MODIFY THE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS RULING WAS NOT PROBABLE ERROR AND DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER THE STATUS QUO OR SUBSTANTIALLY LIMIT THE FREEDOM OF PETITIONER TO ACT.

1. The Court of Appeals Did Not Commit Probable Error.

a. The Association Complied With RAP 18.1.

RAP 18.1 requires a party to request fees in their opening brief and to set forth the reasons why they are so entitled. Here, petitioner takes issue with the fact that the argument for fees on

the counterclaim does not follow the argument on the counterclaim, but rather precedes it. But there is no rule that requires a specific order of argument. The Court of Appeals found the Association's argument broad enough to apply to both the defense of petitioner's claims and its claim as Counterclaimant. The Court of Appeals did not commit probable error when it upheld the Commissioner's award of \$15,555 in attorney fees on the Association's counterclaim.

b. RCW 64.34.455 May Apply to the Collection of Delinquent Assessments.

Petitioner wrongly asserts that allowing attorney fees under RCW 64.34.455 would render RCW 64.34.364(14) superfluous. Petitioner incorrectly states that a more specific statute will always supersede a more general statute. But “[c]ourts do not woodenly apply limiting principles merely because the legislature includes both general clauses and specific clauses.” *Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd.*, 182 Wn.2d 342, 358, 340 P.3d 849 (2015).

The Washington Supreme Court has held that “each provision of a statute should be read together with the related provisions to determine the legislative intent underlying the entire statutory scheme.” *In re Estate of Kerr*, 134 Wn.2d 328, 343, 949 P.2d 810 (1998). “*A more specific statute supersedes a general statute only if the two statutes pertain to the same subject matter and conflict to the extent they cannot be harmonized.*” *Id.* (emphasis added.) In *In re Estate of Kerr*, the issue was whether a more specific statute that allowed attorney fees to the successful challenger of a personal representative, superseded the more general, discretionary, attorney fee statute, which the trial court had used to award fees to the personal representative who successfully defeated the challenge. The Supreme Court held that:

The statutes in this case are not in conflict because RCW 11.68.070 does not prohibit award of attorneys' fees to a successful personal representative. The specific and general statutes would be harmonized by allowing discretionary award of attorneys' fees under RCW 11.96.140.

Id.

Likewise, here, petitioner fails to analyze the statutory scheme. As *In re Estate of Kerr*, the two statutes are different but complementary. RCW 64.34.364(14) mandates attorney fees for collection actions even if suit is not filed. RCW 64.34.455, on the other hand, applies to the prevailing party in a lawsuit, and rather than mandating fees it allows fees only in “appropriate case[s].” The more specific statute, RCW 64.34.364(14) does not state that it is the exclusive vehicle for an attorney fee award for collecting delinquent assessments. Should suit be filed, the Association may also rely on the more general statute for a discretionary award in “an appropriate case.” The Court of Appeals did not commit probable error when it found this to be “an appropriate case” and awarded fees accordingly.

c. Petitioner Has Been on Notice of the Association’s Request for Attorney Fees.

Finally, petitioner argues that he was not on notice of the Association’s request for attorney fees because the specific statute was not pled in its answer or counterclaim. As an initial matter, Petitioner raises this argument for the first time in this

motion. His failure to raise this issue below has waived it. *Sourakli v. Kyriakos, Inc.*, 144 Wn. App. 501, 509, 182 P.3d 985 (2008) (“An argument neither pleaded nor argued to the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”), *rev. denied*, 165 Wn.2d 1017 (2009).

Further, simply because relief was granted under a different statute than that requested in the Association’s answer and counterclaim does not mean petitioner’s due process rights were violated. In *Sarvis v. Land Res., Inc.*, 62 Wn. App. 888, 815 P.2d 840 (1991), *rev. denied*, 118 Wn.2d 1014 (1992), the defendant made a similar argument with respect to a default judgment. Default judgment rules are meant to protect a defendant’s due process rights. *See id.* at 893. The defendant claimed that because the court awarded attorney fees under a statute instead of the lease, as had been pled in the complaint, the relief was different in kind than that pled in the complaint, and therefore, violated CR 54(c). The appellate court found that “[t]he fact that [attorney fees] were granted by a different means

than that which was requested does not make the judgment ‘different in kind,’” which by extension does not violate due process. *Id.*

In addition, CR 54(c) provides in pertinent part:

Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.

Thus, “the court is obligated by CR 54(c) to grant . . . relief even though the claim has not been included in the original pleadings.” *Bird v. Best Plumbing Grp., LLC*, 161 Wn. App. 510, 529, 260 P.3d 209 (2011), *aff’d*, 175 Wn.2d 756, 287 P.3d 551 (2012) (citing *State ex rel. A.N.C. v. Grenley*, 91 Wn. App. 919, 930, 959 P.2d 1130, *rev. denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1031 (1998)). Given this precedent, the appellate court did not commit probable error by awarding attorneys’ fees under RCW 64.34.455, even though that specific statute was not pled in the Association’s answer or counterclaim.

2. The Court of Appeals Order Did Not Alter the Status Quo or Substantially Limit the Freedom of a Party to Act.

“An appellate court may accept interlocutory review of a lower court order if the decision ‘substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act.’ . . . RAP 13.5(b)(2).” *In re Dependency of N.G.*, 199 Wn.2d 588, 590, 594-95, 510 P.3d 335 (2022). The status quo is substantially altered if the decision “has ‘an immediate effect outside the courtroom’ and does not merely ‘alter[] the status of the litigation itself.’” *Id.*; *State v. Howland*, 180 Wn. App. 196, 207, 321 P.3d 303 (2014), *rev. denied*, 182 Wn.2d 1008 (2015).

Here, the Court of Appeals awarded the Association \$15,555 on its counterclaim. This award does not alter the status of the litigation or its effect outside the courtroom. As an initial matter, nothing about the attorney fee award alters the fact that petitioner did not prevail in either the trial court or the Court of Appeals on his claims. Nor does it change the fact that petitioner

is subject to attorney fee awards under the Condominium Act as to each defendant that he sued.

The fact that that award is now \$15,555 larger is not a substantial alteration and has little effect outside the courtroom. The Association already has a judgment on its counterclaim allowing it to foreclose on petitioner's condominium unit. CP 12469-74. The award merely increases the amount that the Association will be allowed to collect at the time of foreclosure. Because there has been no substantial alteration in the status quo, discretionary review is not appropriate. *See In re Dependency of N.G.*, 199 Wn.2d at 601 (holding that allowing the child's dependency guardian to intervene in dependency proceedings for purposes of pursuing a de facto parentage claim did not alter the status quo outside the courtroom because he was already involved in both the child's life and in the dependency proceedings).

Petitioner also contends that Division I's order denying the motion to modify the commissioner's ruling "alters the status

quo because it will result in a judgment lien.” (Motion for DR at 15) He cites *In re the Dependency N.G.*, 199 Wn.2d 588, 595, 510 P.3d 335 (2022), as support for his contention that Division I’s order has effect outside the courtroom. Here an award of appellate fees will result in a judgment lien; a judgment lien does not, however, have an effect outside the courtroom. Moreover, petitioner already has a judgment lien for the attorney fees awarded by the superior court. Here there was no probable error, and nothing has altered the status quo or limited petitioner’s freedom to act. Petitioner’s motion for discretionary review should be denied.

C. THERE HAS BEEN NO DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

RAP 13.5(b)(3) provides for discretionary review if the lower court “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings” as to warrant exercising appellate jurisdiction. As outlined above, for the same reasons that the Court of Appeals did not commit obvious or probable error, it

did not depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals ruled that Association respondents were entitled to attorney fees and costs. Commissioner Koh carefully considered the attorney fee submission and awarded reasonable fees and costs. The Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner's Motion to Modify the ruling regarding attorney fees and costs. The Motion for Discretionary Review should be denied because this case does not satisfy any RAP 13.5(b) requirement.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the Answer to Motion for Discretionary Review contains 2,589 words.

Dated this 1st day of April 2024.

REED McCLURE

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 1, 2024, a copy of the foregoing Answer to Motion for Discretionary Review was served on the following below via the Washington State Appellate Court's Electronic Filing Portal:

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 1st day of April, 2024, at Seattle, Washington.

/s/ Angelina de Caracena
Angelina de Caracena

**APPENDIX TO ANSWER TO MOTION FOR
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW**

	<u>Document</u>	<u>Filed</u>	<u>Page Number</u>
APPENDIX A	Court of Appeals Commissioner's Ruling Regarding Attorney Fees and Costs	11/13/23	1-4

LEA ENNIS
Court Administrator/Clerk

*The Court of Appeals
of the
State of Washington*

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November 16, 2023

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Case #: 824074
1223 Spring Street Owners Assoc. et al., Respondents v. Randall Steichen, Appellant
King County Superior Court No. 18-2-57978-3

Counsel:

The following notation ruling by Commissioner Jennifer Koh of the Court was entered on November 13, 2023, regarding Attorney Fees and Cost:

On October 23, 2023, this Court issued an unpublished opinion affirming the trial court's resolution of Appellant Randall Steichen's dispute with 1223 Spring Street Owners Association and awarding attorney fees on appeal to the Association, CWD Group, and Condominium Law Group.

Counsel for the Association on the counterclaim, Attorney Mary Reiten, has prepared a declaration providing supporting information for a request of \$22,107 in attorney fees and \$25 for parking expenses. Reiten describes her 58.2 hours of attorney work at a rate of \$360 per hour for \$20,952 in fees; 1.4 hours of attorney work by Stephan Fjelstad for \$525 in fees; and 4.2 hours of paralegal work by Laurie Shinyama at a rate of \$150 per hour for \$630 in fees.

Counsel for CWD Group, Attorney Matthew Wojcik, provided detail for a request of \$117,763.50 in attorney fees. Wojcik describes attorney work performed at a rate of \$335 per hour, including 54.6 hours of his own work; 33.8 hours by Attorney Daniel Lindhal; 234.7 hours by Attorney Owen Mooney; and 24.1 hours by Attorney Daniel Bentson, as well as 9.3 hours of paralegal work by Leslie Narayan at a rate of \$135 per hour. CWD Group also filed a cost bill requesting \$211 for copies of clerk's papers.

Counsel for the Association, Attorney Marilee Erickson has also filed a declaration requesting \$98,437 for 641.2 hours of work and \$57.49 in expenses for a copy of a hearing recording to verify the record on appeal. Erickson describes her 91.7 hours of attorney work performed at a rate of \$230 per hour for a total of \$21,091 in fees; 176.4 hours of attorney work performed by Attorney Christopher Nye at a rate of \$200 per hour for a total of \$35,280 in fees; 20.8 hours of attorney work performed at a rate of \$200 per hour by Attorney David Reeve for a total of \$4,160 in fees; and 352.3 hours of paralegal work at a rate of \$110 per hour by Mary Clifton for a total of \$37,906 in fees. The Association also filed a cost bill requesting \$200 in statutory attorney fees, \$1,266.73 for copies of clerk's papers.

Counsel for Condominium Law Group, Attorney Marc Rosenberg, has filed a declaration requesting \$54,639.45 in attorney fees, based on a 10% reduction of the total amount billed of \$60,710.50 and waiving costs. Although the supporting documents show descriptions of hours worked at rates of \$190 and \$275 for attorney work and \$105 for paralegal work, Rosenberg has not provided a total number of hours worked. Based on the total fee amounts, the documents suggest Rosenberg performed between 212 and 307 hours of attorney work and Paralegal Ryan Bridges performed approximately 22.3 hours of paralegal work.

Steichen objects to any award of fees to the Association, contending that the Association's counterclaim counsel did not include a request for fees on appeal as to its counterclaim in its brief on the merits and therefore failed to comply with RAP 18.1. In a footnote, Steichen also contends that the "Association's Counterclaim briefing" is nearly identical to its filings before the trial court.

Reasonable attorney fees are based on the number of hours reasonably spent, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. *Berryman v. Metcalf*, 177 Wn. App. 644, 660, 312 P.3d 745 (2013). RAP 14.3 provides a list of expenses that this Court presumes are reasonable to be awarded as costs.

I have reviewed this Court's file, the fee requests and cost bills, and the objections. After consultation with the panel, I conclude that the amounts requested are not reasonable and must be reduced.

In its 43-page opinion, the panel acknowledges that Steichen raised "multiple" issues and arguments in a "significantly overlength brief" and presented a "voluminous" record. However, the panel declined to extensively address several issues based on Steichen's failure to identify support in the record or authority; resolved several issues based on well-settled authority; and rejected several claims based on undisputed facts and circumstances. Although the panel held oral argument, a review of the recorded hearing reveals that four attorneys split Respondents' 15-minute argument time; the argument did not involve any complex legal analysis; and the panel asked few questions, most of which were focused on clarifying evidentiary details, none of which seemed ultimately dispositive. Although this Court's file shows that the case included a number of motions, nothing in the hearing record or opinion suggests that a total of between 900 and 1000 hours of attorney work by nine attorneys for three Respondents could be considered time reasonably spent on this appeal.

As for Attorney Reiten, who represented the Association on the counterclaim, it appears that the attached time sheets refer to work performed on trial court matters in addition to work on the appeal. As Reiten elected not to clearly separate out time spent on the appeal and I was only able to identify approximately 40 hours of her attorney time for which the descriptions appear to refer solely to work on the appeal, and because the total number of hours worked do not appear reasonable for the overall role of defending the resolution of the Association's counterclaim and attorney fee award on appeal, I will reduce the total number of hours to 40 for Reiten, but include the 1.4 hours of attorney work by Fjelstad and 4.2 hours of paralegal work. Their reported hourly rates of \$360, \$375, and \$150, respectively appear reasonable. Accordingly, I will award \$15,555 of Reiten's requested fees. As this Court does not generally award costs for parking fees under RAP 14.3(a), the requested \$25 cost will not be awarded.

As for Attorney Wojcik's request on behalf of CWD Group, over \$116,000 for 347 hours of attorney work is unreasonable. CWD Group's brief was 9,381 words and was properly focused on Steichen's issues and arguments related to CWD Group's role in the case. The brief explicitly acknowledges Steichen's insufficient briefing and includes a reasonable description of the facts and straightforward discussion of the legal issues. The brief does not appear to include novel or complex analysis. The opinion does not suggest that any particular argument aimed at CWD Group justified such an excessive amount of hours, all of which were billed at the same rate. The motions presented to this Court also cannot explain such excess. While the \$335 hourly rate is not unreasonable for the attorneys listed, it does not appear reasonable or warranted for that many attorneys of that level of experience to spend that many hours on this case. Given the circumstances here, I will reduce the requested amount by just under two-thirds, despite my impression that even 120 hours of attorney time is on the high end of a reasonable range for a case like this. Accordingly, attorney fees in the amount of \$40,200 will be awarded, in addition to \$1,200 for paralegal fees and \$211 in costs under RAP 14.3(a)(2), for a total of \$41,611 to CWD Group.

As for Attorney Erikson's request on behalf of the Association, 288.9 hours of attorney work and 352.3 hours of paralegal work appears unreasonably high. The Association's 9,694-word brief explicitly identified the shortcomings of Steichen's brief and urged this Court not to reach the merits. The brief also clearly addressed the issues and included reasonable argument without

any novel or complex analysis. Although the total number of hours spent appears unreasonable, the billing rates here appear more reasonable than certain counsel of other Respondents, as the amounts are both lower, \$230 and \$200 per hour for the attorneys, and distributed in a more reasonable manner, as Erickson billed 91.7 hours at the \$230 rate, while other attorneys billed 197.2 hours at the \$200 rate, and a paralegal billed 352.3 hours at the \$110 rate. Still, as the total request of over \$98,000 appears excessive and unreasonable for the overall circumstances of this case - in my view and in consultation with the panel - such that an approximate fifty percent reduction appears appropriate. Accordingly, \$50,000 in attorney fees will be awarded, along with \$1,266.73 in costs under RAP 14.3(a)(3), for a total of \$51,266.73. This Court generally does not award the \$200 statutory attorney fee when also awarding attorney fees.

As for Attorney Rosenberg's request on behalf of Condominium Law Group for \$54,639.45 in fees, his total number of attorney hours spent appears excessive for the circumstances of this case. While I appreciate counsel's voluntary reduction in his fee request and waiver of costs, particularly in light of his reasonable hourly rate and the fact that he filed the longest Respondent's brief of 11,991 words, an additional reduction of approximately twenty percent appears appropriate. Accordingly, I will award Condominium Law Group \$44,000 in fees.

Therefore, it is
ORDERED that attorney fees of \$15,555 are awarded to the Association at the request of Attorney Reiten; \$41,611 in attorney fees and costs are awarded to CWD Group; \$51,266.73 in attorney fees and costs are awarded to the Association at the request of Attorney Erickson; and \$44,000 in attorney fees are awarded to Condominium Law Group, for a total of \$152,432.73 in attorney fees and costs. Appellant Randall Steichen shall pay this amount.

Sincerely,



Lea Ennis
Court Administrator/Clerk

jh

REED MCCLURE

April 01, 2024 - 4:17 PM

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Supreme Court
Appellate Court Case Number: 102,739-7
Appellate Court Case Title: Randall R. Steichen v. 1223 Spring Street Owners Assoc, et al.

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